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Abstract
Classical monetary systems regularly subject the most
vulnerable majority of the world’s population to debilitat-
ing financial shocks, and have manifestly allowed uncon-
trolled global inequality over the long term. Given these
basic failures, how can we avoid asking whether main-
stream macroeconomic principles are actually compatible
with democratic principles such as equality or the protec-
tion of human rights and dignity? This idea paper takes a
constructive look at this question, by exploring how alter-
nate monetary principles might result in a form of money
more compatible with democratic principles – dare we
call it democratic money?
In this alternative macroeconomic philosophy, both the
supply of and the demand for money must be rooted in
people, so as to give all people both equal opportuni-
ties for economic participation. Money must be designed
around equality, not only across all people alive at a given
moment, but also across past and future generations of
people, guaranteeing that our descendants cannot be en-
slaved by their ancestors’ economic luck or misfortune.
Democratic money must reliably give all people a means
to enable everyday commerce, investment, and value cre-
ation in good times and bad, and must impose hard limits
on financial inequality. Democratic money must itself be
governed democratically, and must economically facili-
tate the needs of citizens in a democracy for trustworthy
and unbiased informationwith which to make wise collec-
tive decisions. An intriguing approach to implementing
and deploying democratic money is via a cryptocurrency
built on a proof-of-personhood foundation, giving each
opt-in human participant one equal unit of stake. Such
a cryptocurrency would have both interesting similarities
to, and important differences from, a Universal Basic In-
come (UBI) denominated in an existing currency.
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1 Introduction
Today’s nominally democratic capitalist socioeconomic
structures are failing in numerous critical ways: fail-
ing to engage and empower citizens in democratic pro-
cesses, failing to offer citizens with trustworthy informa-
tion sources, resistant to data-driven foreign and domestic
propaganda campaigns, failing to drive political dialog to-
ward consensus and away from polarized tribalism, failing
to manage the corrupting influences of wealth on political
decision, failing to offer citizens opportunities and eco-
nomic empowerment in the face of ubiquitous automation,
failing to control growing inequality sufficiently to main-
tain confidence in the fairness or stability of the system,
and failing to generate the collective wisdom or power
of action to address existential global challenges such as
climate change, These ongoing failures cast increasingly-
widespread doubts about whether democratic self-rule is
up to the task, and leading large populations toward fol-
lowing ideologues with offering quick and easy answers
and scapegoats.
This paper makes the case that the problem is not
that democratic self-rule is inherently flawed or inade-
quate, but that the current embodiments of this concept
are merely engineered insecurely and inadequately, and
in fact are not democratic enough to offer sufficient secu-
rity, stability, or equitability in the conditions of today’s
digital age. In particular, a key problem is that the princi-
ples of democracy are traditionally applied only to one
tiny slice of society’s operation – namely elections for
public office – leaving other key institutions that democ-
racy ultimately depends on, such as economic activity
and information dissemination, operating in fundamen-
tally flawed and non-democratic structures. Democracy
is a technology for self-organization, and like any funda-
mental technological idea, there are any infinity of ways
it can be inadequately, insecurely, or incompletely imple-
mented. If a toaster electrocutes its user or a bridge col-
lapses, we do not question the fundamental utility of toast-
ers or bridges, but instead ask what went wrong in their
engineering or manufacture and attempt to make the next
toaster or bridge stronger and safer.
This paper attempts to sketch a ground-up, “first-
principles” reconsideration of how democratic self-
organizing systems can or should be designed, in light of
both the technological capabilities now at our disposal and
the painful lessons we have learned from the many failures
of our prior toasters, bridges, and democracies. Beyond
serving as merely a philosophical thought-experiment,
this redesign sets the goal of leveraging the present-day
opportunity for in-practice “permissionless innovation”
and deployment, afforded by the popularization of de-
centralized systems such as cryptocurrency, distributed
ledger, and blockchain technologies. In short, while
we make no pretense that established democratic sys-
tems would readily or willingly make structural changes
as deep or fundamental as the ones suggested here, but
instead observe that today’s decentralized systems tech-
nology is becoming mature enough to give us the tools
to “grow” a next-generation system of democratic sys-
tem of self-organization gracefully alongside the exist-
ing gradually-failing ones, coexisting peacefully in the
technological innovation space without requiring either
the support or even explicit permission of the currently-
prevailing authorities.
The focus of this paper is primarily on identi-
fying a set of guiding design principles for next-
generation, technology-driven systems for democratic
self-organization. An important secondary goal is to
identify particular implementation challenges and secu-
rity risks, and to sketch and point to potential solutions
to them. With this in mind, we first outline the gen-
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eral principles and goals we wish to be embodied per-
vasively in a self-organizing system design, then subse-
quent sections will focus on the key operational compo-
nents of information-gathering, decision-making, and in-
centives/economics.
Everything in this paper should be considered a work-
in-progress: the proposed principles are probably neither
complete nor as well-formulated as they could be, and the
technical approaches suggested are merely examples with
no claim that they represent the best possible design. But
then, any healthy democracy must also consider itself al-
ways a work-in-progress as well, evolving to meet new
challenges and fix flaws and vulnerabilities, as we will
explore later in Section 7.
1.1 Summary of Core Principles
We propose that a truly democratic self-organizing and
self-governing community must embody the following
principles pervasively throughout its design and opera-
tion:
1. People as the foundation of power and value:
Democratic power and wealth ultimately originates
in people (humans), regardless of how it might sub-
sequently flow. Similarly, any legitimate democratic
measure of value – of ideas, candidates, property,
services, anything – must be founded in the value of
these things to people.
2. Equal opportunity over population: All humans
living at any given time must have an equal right
to participate and must wield an equal fundamen-
tal power share in all self-organization processes,
regardless of individual characteristics such as age,
gender, skin color, etc. Only people (humans) enjoy
this fundamental right of equal opportunity: legally
or technologically constructed entities such as corpo-
rations and botnets do not.
3. Equal opportunity over time: All humans living
at any time must have equal participation rights and
fundamental power share with respect to their prede-
cessors and ancestors. The successes andmistakes of
prior generations cannot dominate the power, oppor-
tunity, or maneuvering room of their descendants.
4. Democratic governance: All decisions governing
the community’s operation and evolution are made
through democratic deliberation and decision pro-
cesses ensuring that no one is disenfranchised from
the right to participate – including those who for in-
numerable reasons may have limited time or ability
to participate.
5. Democratic economy: Participants must have a vi-
able basis for everyday commerce, investment, value
measurement, and value creation that is compati-
ble with the above democratic principles of equal-
ity. This value basis must not devolve into eco-
nomic aristocracy over time through the gradual con-
finement of individual and collective power to ever-
smaller shares of the world’s total wealth and eco-
nomic power.
6. Democratic information: The processes of gath-
ering, filtering, curating, and disseminating the in-
formation needed for well-informed democratic self-
governance must be likewise secured through demo-
cratic processes, ensuring that no internal or exter-
nal actors can obtain and wield democratically dis-
proportionate influence on the perceptions, decisions
and collective actions of the community.
This paper focuses for now primarily on the problem
of rethinking and redesigning the economic notions of
value and money for consistency with democratic princi-
ples, while only briefly touching on the equally-important
problems of strengthening the democratic foundations
and processes for governance and information-gathering.
This initial proposal is thus intended to represent only a
seed to be expanded in the coming months (and perhaps
years) into a more complete theory of democratic self-
organization in the digital age.
We therefore first develop a democratic notion of value
in Section 2, then build on this a concept of democratic
money in Section 3, and explore its application to wealth
and property ownership in Section 4.
Note: only Sections 1–3 written so far; the others may
be relegated to separate papers, and the above intro will
need to be narrowed accordingly.
2 Democratic Measures of Value
Man is the measure of all things.
Protagoras
Money, in the form of innumerable types of currencies,
are a technology that for millenia have served as a so-
ciety’s primary mechanism to measure value, as well as
to incentivize and reward production of value, including
both physical goods and non-physical services and infor-
mation. But while money and its capitalistic uses have
rightfully held a culturally-accepted central role in the
evolution of democracy and political theory, the principles
underlying money and finance have largely followed a
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separate, parallel track from politics and democracy: sep-
arate technologies playing different roles by vastly differ-
ent rules, though with well-studied, complex, often prob-
lematic interactions. But is this strong separation between
the theories of democracy and finance fundamentally ei-
ther necessary or desirable?
2.1 People-Centric versus Thing-Centric
Value Bases
We explore here whether more tightly intertwining fun-
damental principles of democratic and economic theory
in the right fashion could substantially benefit both, each
helping to address traditional limitations in the other.
Democracy is founded on a people-centric foundation of
value: that all citizens or eligible voters should have equal
rights and equal voting power, at least as a starting point
in a process of political decision-making, and that those
who obtain and exercise unequal power in this process
(e.g., elected officials and the bureaucracies they super-
vise) should ultimately serve and be accountable to the
entire citizenry as a collective. The accepted democratic
measure of the “value” of a candidate or party platform
is based on the number of citizens or voters supporting
them.
Money, by contrast, traditionally embodies a thing-
centric foundation of value, originally based on the
scarcity of materials such as beads or precious metals,
and gradually transitioning to a state-managed notion of
scarcity and value – a transition that Nixon completed
with the abolishment of the gold standard. Even after this
transition to fiat currency, whose value ultimately depends
entirely on collective belief in its value, money is still
viewed, measured, and analyzed in terms of the things that
money can buy or assist in manufacturing through capital-
istic investment.
While the people-centrism of democracy’s value basis
is still widely and rightfully accepted as a social good,
the flow of political power in today’s democracies oc-
curs in extremely coarse-grained, illiquid units enabled by
periodic elections, which are in practice so disconnected
from citizens’ daily lives that elections often fail to per-
suade even half of the citizenry that participating is worth
their time. On the other hand, money is extremely liq-
uid and in ubiquitous use all the time, especially in its
modern electronically-facilitated forms, but the utility and
legitimacy of its thing-centric basis of value is increas-
ingly questionable in an age where automation rapidly de-
creases both the scarcity and hence value basis of physical
goods and human labor in creating them, and digitaliza-
tion and AI similarly undermines the scarcity and hence
the value basis of white-collar human labor in administra-
tive and professional services.
In short, democracy gets the people-centric value ba-
sis right, but its utility and relevance is undermined by
its clunky and illiquid dependence on periodic elections,
while money is liquid and ubiquitous but its thing-centric
value basis but appears to be increasingly disconnected
from the needs of the people using it. Can we combine the
most important elements of each to create useful “curren-
cies” – measures of value – that embody both the people-
centric value basis central to democracy together with the
liquidity and utility needed to make them useful to people
all the time in their everyday lives? We next sketch one
potential approach to answering this question.
2.2 Traditional Elections as an Ephemeral
Democratic Currency
In economics, money can in principle be anything that
generally serves as a medium of exchange, a unit of ac-
count, and a store of value. Government-issued curren-
cies, designed to be “legal tender” within a given juris-
diction, are obviously the most commonly-used form of
money today. But other things – such as gold or Bitcoin –
can arguably serve as money to varying degrees depend-
ing on the extent to which they satisfy these properties of
money.
Taking the definitions of money and currency broadly,
we may view traditional democratic elections as a highly
constrained and ephemeral form of currency. An elec-
tion in effect issues each voter a single quantum of a cur-
rency that springs into existence for that election alone,
and ceases to exist in any useful form after the election is
concluded. The government creates this democratic cur-
rency by issuing each voter a single currency unit, taking
the form of a ballot instead of a banknote, which the voter
may then “invest” by casting it for a candidate or position
of his or her choice. This ephemeral currency acts as a unit
of account because cast votes serve as an explicit, quanti-
fied measure of the democratic value a given candidate or
choice has to the voting population.
The utility of this ephemeral currency as a medium
of exchange is extremely limited, of course: it is gener-
ally unaccepted and often illegal to trade votes for money,
goods, or services. Instead, votes are traditionally “trade-
able” for only one thing: the chance, however uncertain
it may be to materialize, of placing a preferred candi-
date into power or deciding an issue in the way the voter
prefers. Finally, votes serve as an extremely short-lived
store of value, namely from the time they are cast until
the time the election’s results are decided and formally
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announced.
Despite these considerable restrictions, we can argue
that elections already inherently and essentially share key
properties of currency, being most importantly a demo-
cratic measure of value or “unit of account,” secondarily
a medium of exchange (of votes for a chance at influenc-
ing power), and finally an extremely short-lived store of
value during the election. Accepting this connection be-
tween elections and currencies enables us to explore more
deeply whether and how it might be useful to bring demo-
cratic measures of value – in the “one person one vote”
sense – into the traditional realm of currencies. We also
wish to explore on the other hand how to bring more of
the useful properties of traditional currencies – namely
less-restricted utility as a medium of exchange and less
ephemeral store of value – into the realm of democratic
self-organization and decision-making. Can we design
democratic currencies retaining the fundamental egalitar-
ian value basis of elections while providing greater liq-
uidity and utility to make flows of democratic valuemore
explicit, transparent, fair, and sustainable?
2.3 More Liquid Foundations for Demo-
cratic Value
A conventional election typically serves the purpose of
deciding one particular question at a time, independent
of all other decisions – such as which candidate(s) to elect
to a certain governmental role or whether to approve a par-
ticular initiative. This decision-making structure builds on
the implicit premise that by some othermeans it has been
decided that it is time to hold elections to fill these partic-
ular positions or to involve the voters in a particular deci-
sion: e.g., because the constition demands such elections
at a given frequency, because a current government has
ceased to function and needs a fresh mandate, or because
a threshold of voters have signed a petition to bring an
initiative or referendum up for popular vote. These are all
different, and all relatively illiquid, approaches to prior-
itization: determining what activities or issues are worth
spending the voter’s and government’s time and resources
on.
There are precedents for more liquid, currency-like
approaches to democratic prioritization, however. One
rather common and intuitive such approach is cumulative
voting, in which each voter is given more than one vote
– but still an equal number – to allocate to available can-
didates, positions, or priorities as they see fit. Suppose
an election is held whose purpose is to prioritize the al-
location of the community’s time, funding, and/or other
resources among several perceived problems to be ad-
dressed or directions for development: e.g., between in-
vesting in education (A), environment (B), or economy
(C). There may be no question that all these are impor-
tant problemsworthy of attention; the question is only one
of prioritizing and allocating scarce resources between
them. One classic approach to democratic prioritization is
to give each voter, say, 10 votes to allocate as they prefer.
Thus, a voter who cares most about eduction, a little about
environment, and not at all about the economy might cast
six votes for choice A, four for B, and none for C. There
is of course plenty of room for debate – both in electoral
theory and in practice – on whether and in what contexts
cumulative voting is a “good” way to make prioritization
decisions such as this.
For our purposes the point is that cumulative voting
offers one intuitive, widely-used, and easily-understdood
precedent for more liquid, currency-like approaches to
democratic prioritization and decision-making. And if it
is democratically legitimate to give each person 10 votes
in a prioritization decision, then is there any fundamental
reasonwe could or should not make such prioritization de-
cisions even more fine-grained and liquid, for example by
giving each person 100, 1000, or 10,000 votes, as long as
votes are equally distributed? Subdividing voting power
into more fine-grained units in principle enables people to
express more subtle preferences across a wider range of
potential choices, and makes it possible to assign quantifi-
able measures of democratic value not only among some
preselected “top few” choices but instead perhaps among
a relatively open-ended set of choices that anyone might
propose.
2.4 Time-based Foundations for Demo-
cratic Currencies
Both supply-side and the demand-side factors in the thing-
based economy tend to vary drastically over time. The
currently-fashionable mix of goods people demand, the
prices of those goods, the costs to produce and distribute
them, the human labor involved in this production that is
inexorably giving way to automation, all amount to dif-
ferent flavors of quicksand if we seek any stable (let alone
democratic) measure of value.
Many have observed, however, that time itself – or
specifically the time of any given person – might offer a
fundamentally more stable and democratic basis for mea-
suring value. All people inherently have access to the
same universal supply of time, which we all consume at
approximately the same rate, ignoring for now the plight
of people traveling close to the speed of light. For this
reason, person-time has significant appeal as a democratic
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measure of value: a measure that can be said to be just as
“fair” as votes in the sense of equality of power and oppor-
tunity over population, but significantly more fine-grained
and liquid than conventional votes.
This observation has formed the basis of time-based
currencies globally, such as that first suggested and put
into practice in Japan by TerukoMizushima [35], in which
people can bank and trade hours of effort helping each
other. Analogous time-based community currencies have
been explored in the US and elsewhere, such as Time
Dollars [6], Ithaca HOURS [23, 24, 26], and most re-
cently in highly-experimental cryptocurrencies such as
Nimses [39, 32].
Mizushima’s conception of time-banking held to a
strongly-egalitarian principle that everyone’s time has
equal value. This principle may help foster community
spirit and may be practical where the type of work being
traded and the level of expertise required for that work is
relatively homogeneous, as in the caring-centric work that
Mizushima’s time-bank focused on. Other time-banking
systems such as Ithaca HOURS, however, have adapted a
more weakly-egalitarian model in which one person-hour
of currency is intended only to be a nominal or average
guideline for pricing and trading services, recognizing and
explicitly accepting that skilled professionals might rea-
sonably charge several HOURS per hour of their highly-
demanded time.
3 Democratic Money and Currency
Having reviewed several precedents for more democratic,
people-focused notions of value, we now turn toward de-
veloping a notion of money intended to serve in the tra-
ditional roles of money – namely as a unit of account, a
medium of exchange, and a store of value – but ideally
grounded more firmly on democratic values and princi-
ples. We then explore technological means by which we
might establish democratic currencies that could make
democratic money explicit, tangible, and useful in prac-
tice.
3.1 Key Principles for Democratic Money
We first briefly summarize several key principles we
would like a democratic currency to embody, then sub-
sequently delve further into these goals and potential
ways to achieve them. These principles intentially re-
flect the broad principles proposed earlier in Section 1.1,
but focused specifically on their application to democratic
money.
• People-centric value basis: A democratic currency
assigns value to goods and services only to the extent
that they are demanded by people. Constructs such as
corporations can only transmit, not create, real value.
• People-centric money supply: Just as democratic
political power originates in people and flows into
representative government via elections, economic
power in a democratic currency originates in people
and flows into the economy via money. Only people
create money; governments and banks are at most
tools in this process.
• Equality over population: Just as each voter in an
election wields equal voting power, each participant
in a democratic currency must have an equal share
of fundamental economic opportunity with respect
to peers.
• Equality over time: Participants in a democratic
economy at any given time must must have the
same fundamental economic power and opportunity
as those coming before and after. In particular, one
generation’s economic opportunitymust not be dom-
inated by the winnders and losers of prior genera-
tions.
• Entrepreneurship: Within the above constraints, all
participants have equal opportunity to benefit and
profit through excellence, innovation, wise invest-
ment, thereby potentially becoming unequal in out-
come.
• Stability: The value and purchasing power of the
currency should be stable and not swing too rapidly,
widely, or unpredictably, at least with respect to es-
sential commodities such as food and clothes that
themselves embody moderately-stable needs of peo-
ple.
The bulk of traditional economic research and inno-
vation for the past century has been dominated by the
singular goal of stability, attempting to fix the perennial
boom-and-bust cycles of capitalism. While stability is
undoubtably important, we propose that stability should
be only one of several fundamental goals that we should
be designing our money and economic theories around.
We might wonder, in fact, whether in its nearly-single-
minded focus on stability as the sole end-goal, traditional
macroeconomics could be falling into a trap analogous to
the beginning driver who focuses on the car immediately
ahead, or the beginning pilot chasing a desired altimeter
and airspeed reading, resulting in a wobbly and poten-
tially dangerous ride. Both the seasoned driver and the
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experienced pilot know to keep their attention on the hori-
zon – where they’re going – and use their instruments only
to calibrate and confirm the details of their long-distance
trajectory. Could our inability to achieve economic stabil-
ity be in part be in part precisely because we are endlessly
preoccupied with reactively chasing short-term economic
instrument readings without having sufficiently meaning-
ful far-horizon goals to keep our eyes on?
3.2 A Reference Design for Democratic
Money
Given the above basic goals, we now briefly summarize
a reference design for democratic money, intended to sat-
isfy the combination of the above principles, and to be po-
tentially implementable in the form of a modern permis-
sionless cryptocurrency we call Popcoin. We then subse-
quently elaborate the reasoning behind this reference de-
sign.
1. Whenever new currency is created, it is distributed
not to banks but directly to all human participants as
a basic income, in equal portions, to ensure equality
of opportunity over population in foundational pur-
chasing power.
2. Democratic currency represents a limited-term
power to spend, invest, and enjoy the rewards of
fruitful investment in one’s lifetime, but not an aris-
tocratic right to economic power to be passed across
generations. Currency therefore has a nominal lifes-
pan of 50 years, calibrated to approximate the work-
ing lifespan of a modern human.
3. At any time there is a value space of finite size repre-
senting the sum total of all money that exists or could
exist.
4. Each year, all existing currency is first devalued by
the reciprocal of its nominal lifespan, i.e., by one-
fiftieth of its current value in the reference design.
New money is then created to fill exactly the corre-
sponding portion (i.e., 1/50) of the total value space
and distributed in equal measure among all human
participants.
5. Because these distributions are the onlyway Popcoin
is created, the basic income’s purchasing power is
defined not by policy but implicitly as a share of the
total useful utility the currency is providing its users
collectively.
6. This constant-rate devaluation and distribution en-
sure a stable balance between scarcity and a renew-
ing supply of money, ensure equal opportunity over
population (within a given year), ensure equal oppor-
tunity over time (across years and generations), and
incentivize the circulation of money for productive
use.
7. At any time we define the value of one Popcoin to
be the size of the total value space, divided by the
number of participants in the most recent distribu-
tion, divided by the average number of days per year
(365.25). One Popcoin is thus a stable representation
of a one-day share of one person’s basic income.
8. When participation rate increases faster than deval-
uation, participants in earlier distributions receive
a larger slice of that distribution, since each distri-
bution divides a fixed portion of total value space.
These larger slices reward early adopters and incen-
tivize participants to join early and to sign up others.
This early adopters reward is transparent and self-
limiting, however, tapering off smoothly as partici-
pation approaches total population.
We now explore and further develop the principles for
democratic money, and how the reference design satisfies
them.
3.3 Equal Opportunity over Population in a
Democratic Currency
Perhaps the most fundamental principle of democracy is
that all first-class participants or citizens are presumed to
wield an equal share of fundamental power in the collec-
tive (e.g., one vote), even if varying choices can lead to
different effective power outcomes (e.g., serving in public
office versus remaining a private citizen).
Reflecting this basic principle, we define a democratic
currency as a measure of value that has most of the liquid-
ity of traditional money, such as fungibility and divisibil-
ity, but is founded on a people-centric rather than thing-
centric value basis. In a democratic currency, value, like
voting power, ultimately originates from all the individual
participants in equal portion, “one person one vote.” In a
democratic currency, whenever and however new money
is created, it is not distributed to a centralized hierarchy of
banks, who further loan it out to people or businesses the
banks judge deserving. Instead, newly-created money is
distributed directly to all the individual participants (citi-
zens or voters), in equal share, at the time of creation.
After creation and initial distribution in this democratic
fashion, however, individuals are free to trade this cur-
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rency for goods or services, invest it in anticipation of a
future profit, or employ it for any of the traditional uses
money serves. This use of the currency can of course pro-
duce winners and losers, and indeed should, to incentivize
participants to use and invest their resources carefully, and
to reward those who produce value in other forms trade-
able with the currency. Ensuring that participants have
both equal opportunity or starting position, and equal “op-
portunity to become unequal” through subsequent action,
is already thoroughly accepted not only in capitalist eco-
nomics but in the practical operation of modern democra-
cies, which offer privileged and decidedly unequal levels
of power to reward political candidates who successfully
convince voters of the value of their abilities or platforms.
3.4 When and How Often to Create Demo-
cratic Money?
As a naive starting point, we could consider creating a
democratic currency in a “one-shot” fashion. Like the
ephemeral currency that a traditional election effectively
creates, as discussed earlier in Section 2.2, the govern-
ment could at some particular moment launch a brand-
new currency by printing a certain number of new ban-
knotes and distributing an equal share to each citizen. Un-
like votes in an election, however, citizens would be free
and encouraged to trade these new banknotes for goods
and services, and/or to use them as a short- or long-term
store of value. These banknotes would take on some value
based on their scarcity, utility, and the population’s confi-
dence in the government create them (e.g., trust in the gov-
ernment not to cheat or devalue the currency by secretly
printing and distributing more banknotes than should ex-
ist according to the total population and fair-share amount
per person).
Such a “one-shot” currency distribution could obvi-
ously be said to be “fair” or “equitable” only with re-
spect to one particular moment, however, leaving out any-
one born or reaching age of eligibility after this one-time
money creation event. As a result, it seems clear that cre-
ation of democratic money should be a continuous or pe-
riodic process. In traditional elections, people are gener-
ally eligible to vote periodically throughout their lifetimes
after reaching some voting age. A democratic currency
should similarly offer regular benefits to all members of
a relevant population throughout their lifetimes. Thus, as
with elections, money creation in a democratic currency
should probably occur periodically. In principle, this pro-
cess could even occur at the same time and with the same
registration mechanisms, eligibility criteria, etc. Whether
such a close alignment with elections is actually desirable
is a more complex question we do not attempt to address
at the moment.
As with the right to vote, we expect the currency-
distribution benefits of democratic money to terminate
upon the person’s death. Just as it is considered unac-
ceptable to cast a vote for a dead relative, it is equally
unacceptable to draw on a dead relative’s share of basic
income: the survivors must make their way on the basis
of their own incomes, basic or otherwise.
Important differences between the properties we would
want from democratic money versus voting in elections
are greater fungibility and at least moderately longer-lived
utility as a store of value. In particular, as mentioned
above, unlike votes in elections, it should be both allowed
and expected for people to trade their democratic money
for arbitrary goods and services. Further, democratic
money should be fungible, in that people should not have
to know or care which periodic money-printing “batch”
a given coin came from: democratic money should be
more-or-less the same whether a participant received it
in this year’s distribution event, last year’s, or indirectly
from someone else through a trade or investment. Finally,
democraticmoney should be useful as a real store of value
– not just for an ephemeral duration as in the time period
between when votes are cast and an election’s outcome
is announced – but at least long enough to support nor-
mal commerce and investment. How much and how long-
lived this store of value should be gets into questions of
fairness and equality over time that we address in the next
section – but at the very least, it seems clear that demo-
cratic money should offer significantly more long-lived
value-storing capacity than the ephemeral votes cast in a
traditional election.
3.5 The Ancient Principle of Equal Oppor-
tunity over Generations
In addition to the principle of equality over population,
democracy also typically embodies an often-implicit prin-
ciple of equality over time: namely, that voters in one pe-
riodic election should have essentially the same power of
choice as those in prior or subsequent elections – or as
prior or subsequent generations of voters. The policies
one elected government institutes, the next elected gov-
ernment can change or reverse, according to the evolving
will of the people.
Envision, to the contrary, a democratic system of gov-
ernment in which newly-elected governments could only
at most add to or refine existing laws, but had no power to
repeal them; could add new spending items to the budget
but not cancel prior ones; could impose new taxes and/or
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new tax exemptions but never clean the slate and sim-
plify the tax code. The policies of successive governments
would effectively be squeezed into a tighter and tigheter
policy space, its democratic decision-making power grad-
ually crushed under the weight of the decisions, good and
bad, made by the representatives of past generations. Such
a “democratic” system would fail to ensure equality over
time, by effectively allowing the ghosts of past gener-
ations to dominate and subjugate the democratic power
of this generation. In fact, it has been pointed out that
some democratic processes, such as popular initiatives
that overly constrain the elected legislature, can have pre-
cisely this deleterious effect over time, rendering demo-
cratic government progressivelymore gridlocked and dys-
functional [47, 9].
However, such a tendency for past generations’ suc-
cesses and mistakes to progressively dominate future gen-
erations’ opportunities and effective power is a central
tendency of modern capitalist economics, as has been ob-
served by innumerable scholars and definitively quanti-
fied in the work of Thomas Piketty [43]. The winners
of past generations find ways to use their existing advan-
tage to protect and increase their share of wealth, convey-
ing these advantages to their lucky heirs, while leaving
the children of the less fortunate to fight over ever-smaller
pie-slice of global wealth. In short, “the rich get richer.”
Notwithstanding the (substantial) flaws of current demo-
cratic structures, today’s economics unquestionably fails
to ensure that successive generations have the same eco-
nomic opportunities as their predecessors, and often fails
even to offer a pretense that equality of opportunity over
time and generations should be a central economic princi-
ple.
This was by no means always the case: economic re-
newal through periodic cancellation of debt (and freedom
from debt-induced slavery) was a basic and pervasive eco-
nomic principle for thousands of years in antiquity [25].
Sumerian, Assyrian, and Babylonian rules throughout
Mesopotamia, including the famous Hammurabi, regu-
larly proclaimed acts of general manumission, cancelling
all consumer debts and freeing debt-slaves, in part to pro-
tect their own despotic power from encroachment by in-
ternal economic aristocracies, and in part as a military
tactic to ensure a ready supply of peasant infantry and
limit the tendency of debt-slaves to defect to the armies
of neighboring agressors.
Misharum acts released cultivators from the
threat of debt-servitude resulting from financial
arrears. This gave them a stake in the soci-
ety whose boundaries they were fighting to ex-
tend. [25, p.21]
After the power of central palaces gradually gave way
to economic aristocracy in this region around the first cen-
tury BC, Jewish reformers such as Nehemiah and Ezra
embraced this Babylonian tradition of periodic economic
renewal in the written law that they were codifying in
largely its current form. Beyond being a miltary tool for
palace rulers to employ at their discretion, however, these
Jewish reformers extended the principle of periodic eco-
nomic renewal to a populist religious covenant in the form
of the periodic “year of jubilee” – a fixed 49- or 50-year
cycle of freedom from debt and debt-servitude – which
in principle was to be an inviolate law of God that not
even a ruler had the authority to neglect. Jesus, in his
sole act of physical violence recorded in all four Gospels,
drove the bankers and money-changers out of the tem-
ple of Jerusalem as an act of cleansing, in attempt to re-
confirm and reestablish the cultural and religious tradi-
tion that people had a basic right to protection from un-
restricted economic domination by the wealthy. In short,
the tradition of periodic economic renewal was a fixture of
Babylonian, Jewish, and early Christian culture lost only
in modern reinterpretations of those traditions.
Few Christians today recognize that when they
pronounce the word “Hallelujah,” they are re-
peating the ritual term alulu chanted to signify
the freeing of Babylonian debt-slaves, a rite fol-
lowed by anointing the manumitted individual’s
head with oil. [25, p.30]
Of course, the Babylonians’ tool of economic renewal
through periodic debt-cancellations would be disruptive
to the smooth functioning of modern economies, to say
the least. It would undoubtably be difficult for anyone to
obtain a home loan shortly prior to a (scheduled or an-
ticipated) act of misharum, for example. Periodic debt-
cancellations or jubilee years would also ensure fairness
and equal opportunity only over the long term, across gen-
erations, and not over shorter periods: a person who falls
into extreme debt shortly before a jubilee year would ob-
viously be much luckier than a person who does so just
after one. While in some sense economic disruption – for
the purpose of renewal – is in part precisely the point, and
some short-term unfairness may well be tolerable in the
interest of long-term stability, nevertheless there are prob-
ably alternative ways to achieve periodic renewal – and
protect a principle of equality over time and generations
– that do not inherently require a global economic “hard
reset” every 50 years.
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3.6 Achieving Equality Over Time with
Leprechaun Gold
These ancient principles lead us to the obvious question of
whether the principle of equality over time and economic
renewal can be embedded into a modern currency em-
bodying the useful properties we generally expect money
to have. We will focus for now purely on monetary
wealth, leaving other forms of property such as goods or
real estate to address later in Section 4.
Recognizing that periodic economic resets such as ju-
bilee years would be difficult to reconcile with mod-
ern economics in numerous respects, we first examine a
straw-man alternative, which we might describe as lep-
rechaun gold: a hypothetical form of currency in which
each individual “coin” created has a limited lifetime, af-
ter which it silently evaporates. The fundamental idea
here is that however money is created, distributed, and
utilized subsequently, it should confer its holder a tem-
porary share of economic power in apportioning goods
and services and prioritizing society’s endeavors. That
is, such a leprechaun coin should confer a share of eco-
nomic power that lasts long enough to allow any individ-
ual to reap rewards from prudent behaviors and wise in-
vestments within his or her lifetime, but should not trans-
late into a share of aristocratic power that can be passed
down across unlimited successive generations.
On this basis, if we were to pick a particular lifetime for
such leprechaun gold, then the Biblical jubilee period of
about 50 years might be a quite reasonable choice, in that
it happens to correspond roughly to the working lifetime
of a (modern, not Biblical-era) person. There is nothing
magic about these specific numbers, however, and we can
probably expect a fairly wide range of values to work fine
as long as they are globally fixed and within reason.
Combining the leprechaun gold idea with the principle
of equality over population from Section 3.3, a democratic
currency based on leprechaun gold would be created pe-
riodically in batches (e.g., once a year or once a month)
and handed out in equal measure to all individual partic-
ipants alive and eligible at that time, then remain usable
and hold their value for the coin’s lifetime. Each year,
a portion of the previously-existing coins – namely those
that have exhausted their lifetimes – would suddenly van-
ish or otherwise lose all value, effectively “making room”
in the economic value space for the latest batch of newly-
minted coins. At any given moment, the total economic
value space would consist of a “window” of fifty one-year
batches of coins, as illustrated in Figure 1. This approach
would by design guarantee (monetary) equality over time
by ensuring that the money newly-minted and distributed
each year always represents a fixed, one-fiftieth share of
the total economic value space represented by all extant
currency, while allowing for overall economic continuity
without requiring synchronized global hard-resets.
With conventional monetary technologies such as
minted coins and banknotes, one obvious problem with
the “leprechaun gold” approach to economic renewal
would be simple technical impracticality. It is unlikely to
be easy or cheap to manufacture a coin or banknote that
literally vanishes at any time, let alone after a precise time
period not readily manipulable by the holder(s) of the cur-
rency. Coins could simply be engraved with an expiration
date, of course, but people would no doubt find it incon-
venient to have to read and check the expiration date of
every coin or banknote they are handed. However, these
technical impracticality issues vanish in the post-Bitcoin
era: it would be readily feasible, and in fact technically
quite trivial, to create a cryptocurrency similar to Bitcoin
except with a built-in set of rules making coins become
unusable after a globally-agreed-upon time period.
The more fundamental problemwith leprechaun gold is
that it would compromise the fungibility of the currency.
Older coins with closer expiration dates would always
have less effective value than newer coins with longer to
live. Sellers of a good or service would demand more
coins of a given nominal denomination if they are older
and fewer if the coins are newer. Everyone would effec-
tively have to treat the fifty extant batches of currency at
any given moment as fifty separate currencies to be jug-
gled, an obviously impractical task from a usability per-
spective.
3.7 Democratic Monetary Policy: Equality
over Time via Currency Devaluation
While leprechaun gold is thus clearly no more practical
for a modern currency than reinstating Biblical jubilee
years, it does suggests a simple principle for implement-
ing equality over time in a democratic currency: namely,
that the new money minted and evenly distributed in one
year should always represent a fixed (e.g., one-fiftieth)
proportion of the currency’s total economic value space
after the minting. Leprechaun gold implements this prin-
ciple by making all coins suddenly vanish after a 50-year
lifetime, but this is by no means the only way to imple-
ment the principle.
Another simple approach, which ensures economic
rewewal while preserving the fungibility of the currency,
is simply to compress the previous economic value space
each year to make room for the newly-minted currency.
In this approach, old coins never vanish or lose value en-
tirely, but instead smoothly and gradually lose their value
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Figure 1: Illustration of the lifetimes and value space of “Leprechaun Coin”
over time with respect to the value of newly-minted coins.
Suppose we stipulate that the democratic currency should
have a 50-year nominal lifetime like the leprechaun gold
above, roughly matching the working lifespan of a mod-
ern human. Then each year we could simply print and dis-
tribute an amount of new money that sums to exactly one-
fiftieth of the value of all existing or potentially-existing
coins in the prior value space.
In modern economic terms, this simply amounts to im-
posing a fixed yearly rate of monetary devaluation, in
this case 2%, resulting in a corresponding rate of infla-
tion of the prices of anything purchased in the currency.
While other factors such as the size of the population
using the currency and changes in the way they use it
will also in practice affect the currency’s value and the
prices of goods, if all other such factors were held con-
stant the currency would experience a fixed 2% inflation
rate over time. This built-in inflation rate may alterna-
tively be viewed as a periodic tax on the value of all ex-
isting coins in the currency to pay for the regular minting
and distribution of fresh currency.
It is interesting that in this currency design experiment,
we seem to have arrived at a target inflation rate pre-
cisely matching the consensus that central bankers and
economists have arrived at in recent decades for con-
ventional economies – though in pursuit of a different
goal, namely the pragmatic objective of ensuring that
economies have enough monetary “fuel” to avoid nega-
tive interest rates and deflationary spirals, not not so much
as to cause hyperinflation and bank runs [16, 40]. We
might speculate as to whether central banks have effec-
tively “discovered” through practical experience a rule-
of-thumb target inflation rate that in fact works well for
some more fundamental underlying reason: such as (for
example) because a 2% inflation rate effectively causes
money to retain its value over a nominal lifetime roughly
matching a modern person’s working lifespan, giving in-
dividuals the monetary tools to invest and reap rewards in
their lifetimes while ensuring that subsequent generations
have access to enough money to enjoy similar economic
opportunities. On the other hand, it is unlikely that there
is anything magic about the value 2% in particular, and
strong arguments have been made for higher inflation tar-
gets, such as 4% [1].
3.8 Value and Supply Stability in Demo-
cratic Currencies
In a democratic currency operated as described above, at
any givenmoment there is a limited supply of currency, al-
though its total supply obviously increases over time with
each successive distribution of new coins to the popula-
tion. Provided at least some participants also find the cur-
rency useful in some way, for buying and selling certain
goods and services for example, there will be some level
of demand for the currency. Because participants must
hold some amount of the currency in order to use it and
its supply is limited at any point in time, the currency will
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Figure 2: Illustration of value space of constant-inflation democratic currency
have some effective value at any time, determined by the
amount of physical goods (or money in other currencies)
participants are willing to trade one unit of the democratic
coin for. Provided there are at least some participants who
believe in the value of the currency and want to use it for
something, its effective value will be greater than zero,
though not necessarily large.
Because the supply of new democratic currency is fixed
and readily predictable, the demand, and hence value, of
the currency will depend on its use. If participants ini-
tially use the currency for one niche special purpose (e.g.,
to buy and sell virtual curiosities like cryptokitties [34]),
then its demand and hence collective value will initially
be quite low. However, if participants then find additional
uses for the currency, demand increases while the rate of
supply remains fixed, thereby increasing the scarcity and
effective value of the currency, as measured in goods or
other currencies for example. Thus, while we have rea-
son to believe a democratic currency formulated this way
would eventually offer considerable long-term stability,
we are expressly not setting price stability as the primary
end-goal, but are instead allowing the value of circulating
currency to vary with, and effectively be defined by, the
collective use the population makes of it.
Because the supply of the democratic currency grows
at a stable rate, human population does not change that
quickly, and the ways and amounts in which the popu-
lation uses the currency is likely to be moderately simi-
lar and “average out” over the population once the cur-
rency is widely deployed, there is reason to believe that
the currency’s value may be moderately stable over the
long term (though, once again, not necessarily large). In
traditional fiat currencies, money supply is controlled in-
directly by central banks through money-printing and the
interest rate of central bank loans, but its effective supply
is ultimately dependent on the economic sentiments of a
relatively small, elite group of bankers making decisions
on loans and investments.
A democratic currency effectively short-circuits these
financial intermediaries by distributing new currency di-
rectly and evenly to the entire population, thereby inher-
ently spreading the basis for its value and stability across
a much larger and by definition more decentralized popu-
lation. While one or a few individuals may change their
currency-using behavior drastically over a short period, it
is much less likely or common that huge populations do,
except in response to a severe shock of some kind – and
such traditional economic shocks usually propagate from
the financial world to the larger population, not vice versa.
The democratic currency also by design ensures that no
one needs to worry about their supply of currency drying
up entirely since everyone always has a constant supply
of basic income, whatever it may be worth at present in
terms of purchasing power.
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3.9 Relationship to Stamp Scrip and Accel-
erated Money
The idea of regularly devaluing circulating currency is
hardly new. In the early 1900s, Silvio Gesell proposed
a monetary system he called “free money” (Freigeld), in
which the holders of banknotes must buy and affix stamps
to banknotes each week to maintain their validity over
time [21]. Gesell’s purpose for this “carrying tax” was
to incentivize the productive use of money as a medium
of exchange in commerce and penalize hoarding – effec-
tively by making banknotes like “hot potatoes” that the
current holder wants to pass on as quickly as possible.
Because loans in this hot-potato currency would transfer
the carrying tax to the receiver of the loan for its duration,
holders of excess money would be incentivized to loan it
interest-free to a worthy cause instead of holding it them-
selves.
In several small-scale experiments where it was imple-
mented as intended, such as Schwanenkirchen andWo¨rgl,
these stamp scrip currencies indeed seemed to acceler-
ate local economies almost miraculously, until in most
cases the experiment was squashed by central monetary
authorities [8]. Subsequent stamp script attempts in the
US were less successful, in part because they incorrectly
used stamps to implement a transaction tax rather than a
holding tax, incentivizing the exact opposite behavior as
Gesell’s design. At least one community currency based
on Gesell’s ideas has stood the test of time, however: WIR
Bank was founded in Basel in 1934 to create an accel-
erated community currency complementary to the Swiss
franc, and remains in operation to the present, although it
has evolved into more of a credit network for interest-free
barter without the stamp scrip mechanism [11, 49].
Gesell also strongly influenced John Maynard Keynes,
whose macroeconomic theory adopted the explicit deval-
uation idea for the same purposes of ensuring circulation
and avoiding “liquidity traps,” though using the mecha-
nism of deliberate monetary inflation instead of stamped
banknotes [27]. In this way, Gesell’s ideas have indirectly
entered the basic modus operandi of inflation-targeting
central banks [16, 40].
The constant, explicit devaluation we propose for
democratic currency clearly bears close relationship to the
Gesell and Keynes tradition, and we expect its adoption
could have a similar acceleration of commerce effect on
the use of democratic currency. However, in our case nei-
ther the acceleration of commerce, nor the stabilization
of purchasing power that Gesell and Keynes also sought,
are the primary motivating end-goals, but only desirable
side-effects. In democratic money, the essential purpose
of fixed-rate devaluation is to provide a systemic guaran-
tee of equal opportunity over time, by ensuring that the
fresh democratic currency distributions each year always
represent an equal-size “slice” of the total monetary pie at
that time, and that the economic successes and failures of
past generations always make room for, rather than grad-
ually strangling, the economic opportunities of their suc-
cessors.
Since we intend to implement a democratic currency
initially as a cryptocurrency, it is worth contrasting with
Bitcoin [36], which is hard-coded with a strongly defla-
tionist monetary policy. Bitcoin exponentially decreases
its fresh money supply over time so that no more than 21
million Bitcoin will ever be created. Since Bitcoin can and
regularly is lost or destroyed in various ways, the amount
of circulating Bitcoin can only decrease in the long run,
which has strongly incentivized its use mainly for spec-
ulative investment or “HODLing” (Holding On for Dear
Life) in the cryptocurrency culture, eventually to the near-
complete exclusion of productive uses as a medium of ex-
change. As a result, Bitcoin has become more compara-
ble to a collector’s item than a currency: a curiosity not
unlike a painting or a cryptokitty [34], whose price rests
entirely in its scarcity and what collectors are willing to
pay for it. As finance expert Alexander Lipton observed,
“Bitcoin has no value, hence it can have any price!” [33]
In contrast, we want a democratic currency to be a work-
ing currency whose value and price support is primarily
in the commercial utility it is providing the people using
it. Fixed-rate devaluation in the tradition of Gesell and
Keynes support that purpose together with our primary
ultimate goal of providing long-term assurance of equal
opportunity over time.
3.10 Relationship to Universal Basic In-
come
The idea of universal basic income or UBI has recently
been attracting widespread interest, as a way to simplify
the governmental tax and redistribution mechanisms em-
bodying a social “safety net.” The idea of UBI is for
the government to give each citizen a flat basic monthly
income, with no regard for how much they need it or
how they use it. Part of UBI’s appeal comes in the
form of eliminating the complex governmental mecha-
nisms for evaluating need, and closing the loopholes en-
abling abusers to extract undeserved rewards by manipu-
lating the system and claiming need falsely. Another ap-
peal is that UBI eliminates the disincentives to productive
work that current safety net schemes often accidentally
embody: e.g., by disqualifying a person for unemploy-
ment benefits if they hold any job, and hence penalizing
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them for taking a job whose monthly income would be
less than what they obtain through unemployment. Since
a UBI is not affected by employment status, a currently-
unemployed person would always see their total income
increase, and never decrease, by taking on any job regard-
less of salary. Small-scale UBI experiments are underway
in Finland [29, 12] and California [52], and an initiative
for large-scale implementation was recently proposed via
initiative in Switzerland but defeated at the polls [2, 51].
As with many governmental tax-based redistribution
schemes, two of the most problematic questions surround-
ing UBI are how much should the benefits be? and where
should the money come from? Plausible answers to the lat-
ter question typically require eventually cancelling a vari-
ety of existing social safety-net programs and redirecting
their tax revenue to the UBI: otherwise, the claimed sim-
plification benefits of UBI obviously would not material-
ize. However, cancelling even one existing safety-net pro-
gram, let alone many, is fraught with enormous practical
risks and political quagmires, starting with the question of
how effectively a UBI would actually substitute for exist-
ing safety-net programs it is meant to replace.
3.10.1 How to Decide the Amount of Basic Income?
A perhaps even more fundamental challenge with UBI,
however – and a problem that would not disappear even
once the practical and political transition hurdles are sur-
mounted – is answer the question of how much the UBI
should be. Too little, and the UBI will inadequately serve
its safety-net function; too much, and it could impose
an unsustainable cost on the economy or incentivize too
many people to stop seeking traditional work entirely.
And by what principle should the UBI be adjusted over
time? Leaving it at a fixed face-value amount in a tra-
ditional currency will allow inflation to erode the UBI’s
purchasing power and effectiveness with inflation over
time. Keeping the UBI inflation-adjusted might solve that
one problem, but would fail to account for other types of
social and economic evolution. For example, its practi-
cal effectiveness could still gradually lose synchroniza-
tion with society’s quality-of-life expectations, and with
the abstract basket of goods and services that people in
practice consider “basic” and “essential.” For example,
Internet access was until recently considered a luxury but
now is generally considered essential, and the ad-driven
evolution of the Internet ecosystem increasingly makes
many Web sites and applications effectively unusable to
anyone without sufficient bandwidth or a powerful smart-
phone [44].
Perhaps worst of all, an attempt to define and maintain
through policy an explicit basket of goods and services
from which to define the UBI’s value could a policy free-
for-all as every special interest whose product isn’t in the
basket of “essentials” tries to legislate it there (the eques-
trian society claiming that every child has a basic right
to a pony, etc.), as every special interest whose product
is in the basket inflates the prices of its products as the
US medical industry has done (because, after all, some-
one else – i.e., the public – is paying for them via UBI),
and as the slowly-inflating UBI basket of products with
slowly-inflating prices gradually consumes the economy
like a slow-boiled frog.
A key advantage of the proposed democratic currency
approach is that no policy decision is needed to set, or
maintain, the level of UBI, in terms of either face-value,
purchasing power, or lifestyle expectations. The demo-
cratic currency has a floating universal basic income, de-
fined indirectly as a fixed percentage of the total value the
currency is collectively providing those who are using it.
If the currency is being used by only a few people for lit-
tle of importance, as will inevitably be the case initially
if launched as a cryptocurrency, there will at first be little
demand for it aside from speculation, and the value of the
floating basic income denominated in goods or other cur-
rencies may well be extremely small. That is fine, as long
as a few people find some utility in it and we avoid setting
unrealistic expectations. As people find more uses for it,
demand for the currency grows while supply remains a
steady flow in terms of person-hour-coins per year. The
value of each person-hour-coin thus increases in purchas-
ing power, and the effective value of each person’s floating
UBI grows correspondingly. The democratic currency’s
floating UBI promises neither a free lunch nor any par-
ticular standard of living, but instead defines a UBI that a
society can sustainably afford – as precisely the fixed slice
of collective value-space by which the currency is deval-
ued each year to feed economic renewal in ensuring equal
opportunity over time.
The size of that fixed slice, in turn, is calibrated
to a fundamental property of humans that so far re-
mains extremely stable and slowly-changing by economic
timescales: namely, the typical “working lifespan” of a
person, and the respective “nominal lifetime” of coins dis-
tributed to people, which we take to be 50 years in the ref-
erence design. The correctness of this calibration metric
could of course be disrupted if anti-aging science comes
to fruition and people start living hundreds of years – but
let us worry about crossing that bridge once it is in sight.
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3.10.2 Cross-Border Effects and Migration Incen-
tives
A further hazard arising from implementing a basic in-
come at government level is that it will inevitably not be
truly “universal,” but at best universal only within the ju-
risdiction of the country, state, or city that (first) imple-
ments it. Even when neighboring governmental jurisdic-
tions both enact a UBI, the policy-determined amount of
the UBI will almost certainly be different. Richer coun-
tries or cities will want to set their UBI high enough to
satisfy the high standard-of-living expectations of their
citizens, while their poorer neighbors will have to make
do with a lower UBI at best, due to being unable to afford
a higher one if nothing else.
These variances in the existence and amounts of UBI
are likely to create strong migration incentives toward
districts with a (larger) UBI, which are after all handing
out money to anyone who can “prove” residency. One
likely silver-lining benefit of the sheer complexity of cur-
rent safety-net programs provided by governments, and
the many frustrating administrative hoops one must often
jump through to demonstrate need and take advantage of
them, is that not toomany people are probably tempted to
pick up and move to the next city, state, or country just
to free-load on more-generous and well-funded safety-
net programs there (though no doubt some do, such as
Americans who travel or move abroad in part for more af-
fordable healthcare or other safety-net services [5, 48]).
But once the value of one jurisdiction’s safety-net pro-
grams has been transformed into completely liquid, no-
questions-asked handouts of unrestricted cash, the bene-
fit from being a resident of a high-UBI district – or even
“proving” residency in several UBI districts at once by
obtaining fake IDs or other trickery – will be much more
clear and compelling to anyone even a bit “morally flexi-
ble.” The citizens of the high-UBI jurisdictions will nat-
urally perceive this influx of invading UBI-seekers neg-
atively, fueling even more anti-immigrant sentiment and
fortress mentality than we already have.
By implementing a floating basic income in a demo-
cratic currency as described here, in contrast, the UBI by
definition be the same anywhere in the world the cur-
rency is used, would be associated with the currency
and not any given jurisdiction, and would be defined by
the currency’s fixed devaluation-and-renewal rate instead
of varying policies tuned to reflect varying expectations.
People and communities anywhere in the world would be
free to adopt it as much or as little as they see fit (and
as their respective governments permit them). Those that
do adopt and use it contribute incrementally to demand
for the currency, and hence to its total value as denomi-
nated in goods or other currencies, thereby incrementally
increasing the value of the floating basic income – for ev-
eryone using it at once.
The migration incentives resulting from a democratic
currency’s floating basic income will likely, in fact, flow
in the opposite direction as for conventional UBI: namely
toward poorer jurisdictions rather than richer ones. This
is because while the currency will provide the same UBI
for all users, as denominated in other currencies tradeable
with it, the effective purchasing power of that basic in-
come will be higher anywhere the cost of living is lower.
Thus, anyone substantially relying on basic income from
Popcoin will be incentivized to to move to poorer regions
or countries where that income wields more power to pur-
chase the necessities of life. If widely adopted, a demo-
cratic currency could thus help counteract and perhaps
even reverse some of the migration pressures that are cur-
rently stoking anti-immigrant and strong-border attitudes
globally.
3.10.3 Cold Hard Numbers: Guesstimating Basic In-
come from Current Economic Statistics
Accepting that Popcoin’s basic income will not and is not
intended to guarantee any particular purchasing power or
quality of life, can we estimate what this basic income
might amount to if the currency were to become widely-
adopted in some context? Performing a detailed and rig-
orous economic analysis or forecast would be nontrivial
to say the least and is outside both the scope of this pa-
per and the domain of this author’s expertise. However,
we can use readily-available data to produce a few ball-
park estimates under admittedly loose and perhaps wildly
optimistic “thought-experiment” assumptions.
Suppose hypothetically, for example, that Popcoin were
in widespread use today, as the primary money supply
in circulation, either globally or within particular coun-
tries of interest. We make the simplifying assumption
that this widespread use of Popcoin does not significantly
change the size or behavior of the economy other than
by producing a basic income fed by fixed-rate devalua-
tion. This simplifying assumption is of course unrealis-
tic, as adopting a significantly different monetary system
would obviously have many far-reaching and difficult-to-
predict impacts. We hope and expect that the balance
of Popcoin’s impacts would be positive, e.g., making the
economy larger and more active due to the monetary ac-
celeration effect and the fact that everyone would have
a minimal purchasing power base matched with need to
spend on the essentials of life. But other factors would of
course cause effects in the other direction: e.g., currency
devaluation higher than current interest rates could incen-
15
tivize transfer of value away frommoney to other forms of
wealth, thus reducing the amount of global wealth held in
circulating money, especially if provisions for the incor-
poration and gradual devaluation of property-wealth are
not also made as described in Section 4. However, ac-
knowledging the large uncertainties involved, let us pre-
tend that these effects did not exist and that today’s global
economy was based on Popcoin.
Table 1 shows ballpark estimates of what a Popcoin ba-
sic income might look like, denominated in today’s US
dollars, if Popcoin were aready in use globally or in a
somewhat-arbitrary selection of countries.1 We use re-
cent statistics for M1 “narrow” money supply, which in-
cludes immediately-accessible money such as banknotes,
coins, and checking accounts, but excludes less-liquid
forms of money such as savings accounts. This choice
reflects the intended implementation of Popcoin as a cryp-
tocurrency similar to Bitcoin, in which banks, exchanges,
or electronic wallets can neither create nor destroy cur-
rency but can only hold it on behalf of users. Like Bit-
coin, Popcoin would thus behave as a full-reserve cur-
rency [13, 3], in which the contents of immediate-access
checking accounts or digital wallets would be directly
subject to the currency devaluation and democratic dis-
tribution processes, but less-liquid, loan-based accounts
would not be directly affected. Based on these statistics,
we estimate what Popcoin-derived basic income would
amount to yearly in USD, for three different compara-
tive rates of devaluation and democratic redistribution:
a conservative 2% rate representing a nominal currency
lifetime of 50 years, a more aggressively-accelerated 5%
rate closer to the suggestion of Silvio Gesell [21], and
an extremely-accelerated rate of 10% on the boundary of
what economists would call “galloping inflation.”
These estimates make it clear that we should make no
pretense of expecting a basic income derived solely from
circulating Popcoin, even if ubiquitously adopted glob-
ally, to offer a satisfying quality-of-life in developed coun-
tries or to replace their existing safety-net programs. The
basic income Popcoin provides might be hardly notice-
able financially to the average resident of the developed
world, in fact. However, when compared to the UN’s offi-
cial global poverty line of $1.90 per day or $694 per year,
the basic income derived from a globally-deployed Pop-
coin could cover a significant fraction of the distance to-
ward eliminating global poverty by this definition, if not
quite achieving it. In fact, the Popcoin basic income at the
Gesell “Freigeld” rate of 5% would be sufficient to over-
come the current official national poverty line of India,
which is well below the UN’s global poverty line. Viewed
1
in this light, the basic income Popcoin could in principle
be meaningful to the finances and quality of life of a large
percentage of the world’s population, if by no means a
complete solution.
Of course, basic income level that might be expected
from widely deploying Popcoin within a particular coun-
try would of course vary widely based on how rich or poor
the country is, as illustrated by the estimates based on the
M1 monetary supply and population of particular coun-
tries in Table 1. If ubiquitously adopted in Switzerland,
one of the world’s richest countries per capita, Popcoin’s
basic income would be the envy of much of the devel-
oping world – but would appear quite unimpressive in
Switzerland itself, reaching only a small fraction of the
way up toward Switzerland’s national poverty line. If
a poorer country such as India or Nigeria adopted Pop-
coin internally, the results might be similarly less than
satisfying with respect to the global poverty line. These
estimates thus clearly underline the need for Popcoin to
be ultimately deployed “across boders” – among large
populations in rich and poor countries alike – before we
can plausibly expect the basic income it furnishes to of-
fer financially significant purchasing power to a signifi-
cant portion of its population of users. These numbers
also underline the huge risks inherent in trying to imple-
ment conventional basic income ideas at policy-defined
amounts corresponding to national quality-of-life wish-
lists, both in terms of the internal affordability and sus-
tainability of such programs, and in terms of the intense
migration pressures from poor to rich countries that such
programs would inevitably exacerbate.
Since widely deploying Popcoin across borders involv-
ing both rich and poor countries would clearly create a
significant wealth redistribution flow from the former to
the latter, why might we expect the residents of rich coun-
tries to be willing to adopt an international democratic
currency like Popcoin voluntarily? Two main plausible
reasons present themselves. Potentially appealing to the
more socially-conscious members of rich populations is
the simple argument that it’s the right thing to do, in the
interest of addressing global inequality problems and es-
tablishing a more sustantiable global economic founda-
tion, and would represent a readily-affordable cost to the
residents of rich countries. Potentially appealing to the
more inwardly-focused members of rich countries with
strong anti-immigrant sentiments, in contrast, is the argu-
ment that Popcoin would help counteract the global mi-
gration pressure on the rich countries – even incentivizing
less-well-off people to move in the opposite direction to-
ward poorer countries where their Popcoin-derived basic
income would be exactly the same but their cost of living
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Basic Income Official
M1 Money Population (USD/Year) Poverty Line
Region (USD Million) (Thousands) 2% rate 5% rate 10% rate (USD/Year)
Global 36,800,000 7,630,000 96.50 241.00 482.00 694.00
Switzerland 657,000 8,540 1,540.00 3,850.00 7,690.00 26,900.00
United States 3,660,000 327,000 223.00 560.00 1,120.00 11,800.00
India 440,000 1,350,000 6.51 16.30 32.60 172.00
Nigeria 30,200 196,000 3.08 7.70 15.40
Table 1: Ballpark basic income estimates based on M1 money in today’s global economy
much lower. Thus, there seems at least hope that a basic
income derived from a properly-implemented and widely-
deployed Popcoin could appeal in different ways to both
the more left- and right-leaning populations alike in the
richer countries.
3.11 Implementing Democratic Money as a
Cryptocurrency
A government’s central bank could in principle issue
a new currency – or even revise the monetary policy
and distribution of some existing currency – according
to the above principles to create democratic money. A
government-initiated rewriting of monetary principles this
fundamental is unlikely to happen any time soon, how-
ever, not only due to the momentum of conventional eco-
nomic thought, but also because such a transition would
represent a huge and risky transition in practice if taken
suddenly.
The emergence of digital cryptocurrencies such as Bit-
coin, however, offer the opportunity for the relatively
“safe” redesign and deployment of new currencies em-
bodying new principles at small scales. Creating a new
cryptocurrency requires only that a fairly small group of
people consider the idea for the currency interesting, and
invest their time and energy into its development and de-
ployment. A new cryptocurrency effectively creates a
new metric of value which can gracefully coexist with all
the existing currencies and quasi-currencies such as fre-
quent flyer programs and such, without needing the per-
mission of any existing organization or government, apart
from conformance to the currently-emerging regulatula-
tory regimes applying to cryptocurrencies.
The design of currently-deployed cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin, as well as emerging proposals designed
to improve their scalability [31, 15, 30, 22], privacy [46,
45, 37], and functionality [38], should in most respects
be sufficient to support the technical requirements of a
democratic currency as described here. Bitcoin, for ex-
ample, already has a particular fixed monetary policy em-
bedded in the software that all the miners and users run:
namely a strongly deflationarymonetary policy, where ex-
ponentially less new money is created by the miners over
time such that at most only about 21 million Bitcoin will
ever exist. Bitcoin’s monetary policy obviously comes
nowhere close to satisfying our principles of equality over
time and constant economic renewal, and its deflationary
model strongly incentivizes speculative investment in it
over any productive use as a working currency. But the
arbitrary monetary policy Bitcoin encodes in its software
can readily be changed to a different monetary policy in a
different, democratic cryptocurrency.
3.11.1 Membership and Stakeholder Models for
Cryptocurrencies
A key technical challenge to implementing a democratic
cryptocurrency is to enforce a membership or stakeholder
model securely in which each human participant can ob-
tain one, but only one, equal share of cryptocurrencymint-
ing or mining power. The fundamental problem is that
today’s digital systems have no secure way to distinguish
between two (or a thousand) real people, and two (or a
thousand) fake identities held by only one real person.
Bitcoin attempted to solve this fundamental technology
challenge through Proof-of-Work, in which participants
compete to solve cryptographic puzzles in order to win
temporary membership rewards and create new currency.
Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work model, as well as most other
proposed foundations for cryptocurrencies such as Proof
of Stake [28, 22], Proof of Space [14, 42], etc., are all
investment-proportionalmembership and reward models:
anyone who can afford to invest more in the system reaps
at least proportionally greater rewards. In fact, due to
the economies of scale and the many competitive advan-
tages available to the biggest players in current cryptocur-
rencies, larger investors in cryptocurrencies can typically
obtain disproportionately larger shares in power and re-
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wards, which has rapidly re-centralized mining power and
profits into the hands of a few large players [20, 19, 50].
In short, because their mining power and reward mod-
els are investment-proportional rather than population-
proportional, today’s cryptocurrencies fail either to “de-
centralize” or “democratize” money reliably, and instead
merely reproduce the “rich get richer” principle of uncon-
strained capitalism in the guise of new technology.
3.11.2 Enforcing “One Person One Vote” via Proof-
of-Personhood
Thus, a democratic currency would actually have to ad-
dress and solve the fundamental technical challenge of
distinguishing real people from fake accounts. One obvi-
ous way to do this would be for a government or other or-
ganization to manage membership in the cryptocurrency
by checking government-issued IDs or taking biometric
samples of participants and checking them against a mas-
ter database to make it difficult for one person to obtain
many accounts or memberships. This approach, while
plausible, embodies problems of security (e.g., it is not
in practice that difficult or expensive to obtain fake IDs),
centralization (we must trust some authority to check bio-
metrics and maintain the database), and privacy (the mas-
ter ID or biometric database becomes a prime target for
hacking or leaking).
A potentially more decentralized and privacy-
preserving alternative approach is via pseudonym
parties [17], or real-world events run by local or regional
communities in which people can show up in person and
obtain pseudonymous tokens. Pseudonym parties enforce
“one person one vote” equality over population on the
basis of physical security and the fact that real people
still, for the moment, have only one body and therefore
can be in only one place at any particular time. The
use and adaptation of pseudonym parties as a basis for
cryptocurrencies has already been proposed as “Proof of
Personhood” [4]. Development and experimentation with
this model is ongoing, but we leave the details of this im-
portant technical challenge out of the scope of this paper.
Another alternative approach being explored, similar in
end goal but pursuing a fully-online mechanism, is Proof
of Individuality [41], in which participants verify each
other’s apparent humanness through video conferencing.
It is unclear how long such “online Turing tests” can
plausibly remain secure, however, given that today’s
audio, visual, and artificial intelligence technologies
can already synthesize fake humans that trick a real
human into believing they’re conversing with another real
human [7].
3.11.3 Cryptocurrency Accounting in Popcoins and
Poplets
We have so far described Popcoin’s economic principles
in terms of an abstract value space, neglecting details such
as how accounting is done in this value space. We now
descend slightly into these details.
We take Bitcoin as a reference cryptocurrency, in which
money never has any physical embodiment, but purely
takes the form of information on a distributed ledger or
blockchain. As in Bitcoin, Popcoin defines rules coded
into software implementations for how and when money
can be created, and how money may be transferred, based
on transactions entered on this digital ledger. Both trans-
actions that create money (coinbase transactions) and
those that merely transfer money (payment transactions),
when validated and successfully committed to the ledger,
create unspent transaction outputs or UTXOs that subse-
quent transactions may spend by “consuming” as inputs.
Satoshis versus Poplets: Leaving operational details
aside, the important question for now is how to represent
the value of these transaction inputs and outputs in Pop-
coin ledger entries. Bitcoin represents the value of inputs
and outputs as an integral number of Satoshis, the smallest
atomic unit that can be transferred, defined as a hundredth
of a millionth (10−8) of one Bitcoin.
Following Bitcoin’s example, we find it convenient to
represent transaction values in integral multiples of some
atomic unit of value, which we will call Poplets. Like
Satoshis, Poplets will be indivisible, one Poplet represent-
ing the smallest nonzero transfer that can be made, en-
abling us to avoid the complexity of floating-point and the
management of roundoff errors in value accounting on the
ledger. We want Poplets to be small enough to allow suf-
ficient accounting precision for practical use and subdivi-
sion as needed even in the hypothetical “worst-case” sce-
nario in which the entire world population of 7.6 billion
people immediately adopted Popcoin as the single global
currency and the unit of value in which all currency and
noncurrency wealth is measured.
Taking total global wealth currently estimated at 280
trillion USD [10], we convert this into Iranian Rial (IRR)
– currently the weakest official currency globally at about
42,000 IRR per USD [18] – to arrive at about 1.2 × 1019
IRR as current global wealth measured in the most fine-
grained modern currency unit that anyone might plausibly
wish to transfer. Since this just below the convenient bi-
nary integer 264 (about 1.8 × 1019), we define Popcoin’s
initial total value space to be exactly 264 Poplets in size
– enough precision to accommodate comfortably today’s
entire wealth economy, denominated at IRR granularity in
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this value space, in the fairly unlikely event that we should
need to.
While Bitcoin’s deflationary monetary policy limit its
value space forever to about 21 million Bitcoin or 2.1 ×
1015 Satoshis, the size of Popcoin’s value space grows
gradually over time without bound. This gradual ex-
pansion, of the number of Poplets representing the value
space, enables us to implement Popcoin’s periodic mon-
etary devaluation and redistribution without ever having
to update the Poplet-denominated account balances in ac-
counts or unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) on the
Popcoin ledger. At the 2% devaluation rate corresponding
to 50-year nominal currency lifespan, this means that each
year we multiply the total value space size in Poplets by
a factor of 50/49, then create and distribute new currency
amounting to 1/50th of the new value space denominated
in Poplets. For example, starting with a year 0 value space
of 264 ≈ 1.84 × 1019 Poplets, at year 1 the value space
expands to 264 × 50
49
≈ 1.88 × 1019 Poplets, at year 2 it
expands to 264× (50
49
)2 ≈ 1.92× 1019 Poplets, and so on.
Bitcoins versus Popcoins: Bitcoin defines a fixed “ex-
change rate” between its minimum-granularity unit of
value (the Satoshi) and its “face value” unit intended for
user consumption (one Bitcoin, or 100 million Satoshi).
If we similarly define one Popcoin to be a fixed number
of Poplets, then Popcoin will suffer the same mild but
annoying flaw in “user experience” (UX) as all modern
Keynesian inflationary currencies, namely that the face-
value of the currency is worth less over time. All prod-
uct prices, salaries, etc., must be periodically raised to
account for this loss of face-value, and economists must
constantly inflation-adjust prices to make useful compar-
isons of value across historical timelines. While we have
been living with and could no doubt continue to live with
this UX flaw, the flexibility of cryptocurrencies – in which
the only face-value amounts users ever see are computed
dynamically by digital wallet and payment applications
anyway – gives us the opportunity to fix this flaw with-
out introducing other UX inconveniences such as Gesell’s
stamped banknotes [21].
We therefore define one Popcoin as equal to a time-
varying, rather than fixed, number of Poplets. In the tra-
dition of time-based currencies, we define one Popcoin to
be equal to one day’s supply of one person’s basic income,
whatever that may be worth in terms of purchasing power.
That is, at any given time, one Popcoin is equal to the
number of Poplets of money newly-created in the most re-
cent year’s distribution (i.e., 1/50 of the total current value
space size), divided by the number of participants in the
most recent distribution, divided by the average number
of days per year (365.25). This way, if and when use of
Popcoin stabilizes in some user population, in terms of
both number of participants and their typical usage pat-
terns, one Popcoin in one year will represent similar eco-
nomic purchasing power as one Popcoin several (or many)
years in the future, requiring no inflation-adjustment of
face value over time.
The minor downside of this time-varying definition of
Popcoin with respect to Poplets, of course, is that the face-
value balances of account balances denominated in Pop-
coin will suddenly change at yearly devaluation and redis-
tribution events, as a result of the increase in total value
space size and any year-to-year changes in participating
population. Account balances will remain the same when
counted in Poplets, but will change year-to-year when de-
nominated in Popcoin. People are already accustomed to
their electronic bank account balances changing more-or-
less automatically from month to month and year to year,
due to charging of fees, depositing of interest, etc., so
such occasional face-value changes in account balances
seem workable. A question for further study is whether it
would be beneficial, or problematic, to “smooth” these ac-
count balance changes by adjusting the Popcoin-to-Poplet
ratio gradually throughout a year rather than in one more-
noticeable step each year.
3.12 Population and Participation Changes
and Adoption Incentives
So far we have assumed that the number of participants
using Popcoin is relatively stable and fixed, but of course
this is not the case in practice. In the long term, once
a democratic currency is widely adopted, its population
of users might eventually be relatively stable and slow-
changing, since human population increases at a lim-
ited and relatively slow rate in comparison with eco-
nomic timescales, and rarely decreases rapidly except due
to catastrophic wars or disasters. However, if demo-
cratic currency is introduced as a cryptocurrency operat-
ing alongside traditional currencies, as seems most practi-
cally feasible and experimentally safe, then the currency’s
user populationwill start out tiny and grow as people learn
about and start using it.
In defining Popcoin’s distribution and devaluation
mechanisms, we have made no special provisions for
changing population, other than requiring that each dis-
tribution of new currency be divided equally among the
population participating at that time. To analyze the ef-
fect of this design, first consider the long-term situation
when the currency is widely adopted and the user popu-
lation is changing slowly due to human births and deaths,
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and also that the ways in which the population is using the
currency – the types of goods and services they are sell-
ing and buying with it – is also relatively stable. Suppose
that in some year Y , a population of one million uses Pop-
coin, and that twenty years later at Y +20, the population
has doubled to two million. At years Y and Y + 20 the
same fraction (1/50) of the currency’s total value space
is reclaimed through devaluation and distributed equally,
among 1M people at Y and among 2M at Y + 20. Thus,
each person’s basic income slice at Y +20will be half the
size, measured in percentage of the total currency value
space, as each person’s basic income back in year Y .
Does this mean each person’s basic income at Y + 20
will have twice the value as at Y ? Definitely not, be-
cause the overall economy using Popcoin has also grown
in the meantime. Again assuming the people at year Y
and Y + 20 use Popcoin in roughly the same amount and
fashion, at year Y + 20 there will be twice the number
of people needing to buy and sell about the same amount
of food, services, etc., thereby doubling the effective de-
mand for Popcoin, and hence doubling the total commer-
cial value that Popcoin’s value space represents as mea-
sured in products, services, or another currency with sta-
ble value. Thus, if population changes gradually while
other factors remain fixed, each person’s basic income
may be expected to have about the same purchasing power
at year Y and at Y + 20, despite each person’s slice of
the yearly pie having been cut in half. And because of
the currency’s regular devaluation, people at year Y will
probably have long ago spent or invested their incomes
(basic or other) by the time Y + 20 rolls around.
Consider now, however, what happens when user popu-
lation changes rapidly, e.g., as a cryptocurrency originates
in a small group and “catches on” as more people discover
and voluntary adopt it. Suppose, for example, the user
population doubles in just one year, from Y to Y + 1. In
this case, the basic income pie-slices at year Y are twice
has large as those distributed at year Y + 1, and have de-
valued by only 2% in the meantime. Thus, the users who
participated at Y , and held onto most of their basic in-
comes, see a near-doubling of their account balances as
measured against the basic incomes distributed at Y + 1.
Whether this effect is good or bad depends on goals and
tradeoffs. On this upside, this effect creates a potentially
strong early adopters’ reward, and incentivizes those early
adopters to help sign up more users, since the reward ma-
terializes only if and to the extent user population grows.
Since it seems both unlikely and risky in practice to try
to introduce a currency as unconventional as Popcoin all
at once in any large existing society, its success will ul-
timately depend on growth based on voluntary adoption,
and appropriate early-adoption incentives may be essen-
tial to the currency achieving critical mass.
On the other hand, one clear potential risk is that of
Popcoin appearing like a Ponzi scheme. It is not, be-
cause the early-adoption rewards are both fully transpar-
ent and gracefully self-limiting. Anyone can trivially cal-
culate the remaining potential early-adoption reward – the
factor their first basic income distribution could be multi-
plied by if they join now – by simply dividing the total
population of the world (or of those countries that might
plausibly allow Popcoin to be widely adopted) by the cur-
rent user population. If and when Popcoin is successful
and nears saturation among some relevant population of
potential users, the early-adoption reward factor gradually
and smoothly drops to one, i.e., no reward. Conveniently,
that is also precisely the point at which adoption incen-
tives are no longer needed.
A secondary risk is that his early-adoption reward is
likely to encourage hoarding and speculative investment
in the short term, in the same way we have observed
in other cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. This short-
term effect is thus precisely the opposite of what Gesell,
Keynes, or we, would probably want in a stable “working”
currency. However, in contrast with classical macroeco-
nomic economics in which stability is the primary goal,
for us stability is only one of our goals and not necessarily
the most important in the short term, as discussed earlier
in Section 3.1. We are willing to sacrifice some short-term
stability in the interest of enabling adoption of a monetary
system that may promise to be much more fundamentally
sound, sustainable, and ultimately stable, in the long term.
Like a pilot caught in the eye of a growing hurricane, we
find it far preferable to tolerate the bumpy and difficult
ride that might be necessary to get out, than to circle in
place in pursuit of short-term stability alone until we run
out of fuel and crash.
4 Property and Ownership in a
Democratic Economy
In preparation.
5 Securely Democratizing Informa-
tion
In preparation.
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